International Journal of Business and Management Invention
ISSN (Online): 2319 – 8028, ISSN (Print): 2319 – 801X
www.ijbmi.org || Volume 4 Issue 5|| May. 2015 || PP-52-64

The influence of managerial ownership,institutional ownership and voluntarydisclosure on financial performance and its implication on The corporate value

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ABSTRACT: *The purpose of this study is to examine and determine the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure on financial performance and its implications on the value of the manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The populations in this study were all companies registered manufacturing sector in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). Observation period of the research conducted from 2010-2013. Manufacturing industry group based on this study, there were 123 companies from three sectors of industry (basic and chemical industries, various sectors of the industry, the consumer goods sector). Analysis of the data in this study was using a statistical t-test, statistical f-test, and path analysis.The results showed that managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure partially have significant effect on the financial performance. However, institutional ownership have no significant effect on the financial performance. Managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure have significant effect on the financial performance simultaneously. The next, the results showed that managerial ownership, institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure and financial performance have a significant effect on firm value either partially or simultaneously on the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange.*

KEYWORDS : *Managerial ownership, institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure, financial performance, corporate values*

I. INTRODUCTION

A major intervention of the owner in a company management causes a poor management and results on bad performance. Due to the major intervention of the owner, the company management frequently has to consider a decision or opinion given by the owner which is sometimes not suitable with the standardized company management. Moreover, management as the company executive is an agent of the owner to carry out the company in accordance with the owner's interest. Therefore, the management and the owner have different interest which can result to conflict of interest. The conflict frequently occurring between them can be said as agency conflict. Agency conflict appeared as the result of the separation of ownership and controlling right (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.305-360). Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and also Wolk et al. (2004) stated that as the result of the separation, the manager as the agent executing the company can act in accordance with his/her own interest which is contrary to the owner's / principal's interest. This is because the management has freedom to make decision and take some actions. Due to the freedom, it encourages the emergence of moral hazard which is through the decision and opportunistic actions which are beneficial for one side only and the loss which has to be borne by the shareholders on the other side. The opportunistic actions done by the management can cause decreased firm value.

Although there is an indication of the influence of the ownership structure toward the performance and the firm value, but those information is not sufficient for related parties to make appropriate decision. The information which should be acquired by the stakeholders of the company such as the investor is about the real condition of the company, both of finance and non-finance.

Capital market will be always related to information disclosure to the public which should be done by Open Company as the consequence of obtaining society funding by the open company. Bapepam as the regulator of the capital market has an obligation to constantly improve the quality of the information delivered to the society as an attempt to protect the investor (Bapepam, 2002).

The open company is required to present an annual report in the form of and contains financial report as mentioned in Kep-38/PM/1996. The duty mentioned in this decision is called mandatory disclosure or adequate disclosure. Although all the open company is required to meet the minimum disclosure, they are different substantially in the number of additional information they reveal to the users of financial report, and it is called as voluntary disclosure.

Generally, financial report presented by the company contains some information related to the company finance. To present more complete information, the company usually reveals some information related to the company which is not included in the financial report. The disclosure is also intended to reduce asymmetric information between the management and the stakeholders. Therefore, the stakeholder assessment on the company is not wrong, which the company eventually is not assessed under pricing.

Related to the background, this study is aimed at identifying and examining how the managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure influence the financial performance, and the next is what the implication toward the firm value is. There are some differences between this research and the previous research which is on the scope of the variable testing and the analysis. Based on some previous research, there was no a research which examined and analyzed comprehensively of the influence of the managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure toward financial performance and what the implication toward the company is. Hence, this research is on the position of testing and analyzing comprehensively and thoroughly of the influence of the managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure toward financial performance and what the implication toward the company is.

Based on the mentioned reasons, the research entitled "The influence of the managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure toward financial performance and its implication toward the company is" important and relevant, to be able to give empirical evidence of the influence and the relationship between the variables.

Based on the mentioned background, the research questions are formulated as follows:

1. How far is the relationship between the managerial ownership and the institutional ownership of Manufacturer Company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange?
2. How far is the relationship between the managerial ownership and the voluntary disclosure of Manufacturer Company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange?
3. How far is the relationship between the institutional ownership and the voluntary disclosure of Manufacturer Company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange?
4. How are the influence of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure toward corporate financial performance both partially and simultaneously?
5. How are the influence of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure, financial performance toward corporate value?

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Brigham et al. (2008) mentioned that the loss or the expense which should be borne by the company as the results of the conflict is called agency cost. As stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), there are some forms of agency costs such as first, monitoring cost. Monitoring cost is an expense done by the principal to monitor the manager's activities and behaviors. Second, bonding cost is an expense done by the manager to assure the owner that the manager does not do anything that harms the company. The further expense is the expense issued by the principal in a certain situation known as residual loss. At last, all the agency cost problems will be borne by the shareholders.

Several studies have been conducted relating to the method of how solve the agency problems, particularly those which are related to agency cost. As mentioned by Ang et al. (2000), the mechanism to control the agency cost can be done by increasing the managerial ownership. The action can be intended to equalize the position of the manager and the shareholders. Hence, the same goal would be reached where the manager will perform in accordance with the shareholders' interest. Afterwards, Ang et al. (2000) stated that the managerial ownership of 100% can reduce agency cost to zero. Other study revealed that agency cost can be reduced by the payment of dividend, the use of debts, and estimating the level of risk which can equalize the interest between the manager and the shareholders (Chen & Steiner, 1999 in Ang et al., 2000, p.81-106).

The next question is what about the agency problem in Indonesia? Do the methods proposed by the researchers to solve the problem can be implemented in Indonesia? To answer those questions, it needs adequate understanding and comprehensive studies of agency conflicts in Indonesia. As mentioned by Brigham et al., (2008), agency problems can occur 1) between the management and the shareholders, 2) between the manager and the creditor, and 3) between the shareholders and the creditor. Meanwhile, Gilson and Gordon (2003) stated that there are two sides of agency problems. First, a well-known classical agency problem is the conflict between the principal and the agency. This agency problem occurred due to the separation of the ownership and the control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.305-360). Second, agency problem is between the controlling shareholders and the minority of the shareholders. This agency problem appeared because of the ability of the controlling shareholders to gain self-benefits upon the control they have. The minority of the shareholders does not have self- benefits upon the control.

The presence of the controlling shareholders causes decreased agency problems between the management and the shareholders, but the other agency problem appeared between the controlling shareholders and the minority of the shareholders. Agency problems in Indonesia may be different from findings of the previous research. As stated by La Porta et al. (1999), several companies in Asia have concentrated ownership structure; some American companies have spreading ownership.

Meanwhile, Husnan (2001) mentioned that the conflict between the manager and the shareholders taking place in a company which has spreading ownership, where the number of the shareholders is more than the shares they have, so that the control done by the shareholders tend to be weak which leads to the weak monitoring, then the monitoring cost is much bigger than the benefits they gain. Consequently, the manager demands a high compensation which results the agency cost increases as well.

The effect of concentrated ownership causes agency problem differs from the spreading agency problem in the ownership. Beside the agency problem occurring between the shareholders and the creditor, the agency problem also occurs between the insider and the outsider. As explained by La Porta et al. (2000) that the company with concentrated ownership, the agency problem occurs between the insider and the outsider. But, the insider in this case is not the management anymore, but the controlling shareholders. The implication is that the controlling shareholders can determine the policy direction which will be carried out by the management. Furthermore, Husnan (2001) stated that a company with concentrated ownership will cause agency problem between the shareholders and the creditor, where the condition reduces the equity of the agency expense, but it causes agency debts.

The evidence of concentrated ownership in Indonesia found by Gunarsih (2003) which stated that based on the companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 1993-1997, it shows that concentrated share ownership on the first biggest shareholder, the average is 48.6%, and the average of five biggest shareholders who have 68.9% of the spreading number of the shares. Afterwards, by using some samples of the companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange in 1994-2000, Gunarsih (2003) mentioned that the samples of the companies which have concentrated ownership on three biggest owner with the average of 65%. It means that there are approximately 35% of the company's shares samples owned or spread on the shareholders outside the company. The concentrated ownership is generally held by the institution owner, which is in form of institution, not in the name of individual. Institutional ownership shows the average of 65.65% and less that 10% of the company with the percentage of the ownership is less than 42.04%.

The influence of ownership structure has been documented in the previous research. The study conducted by Oktaviana (2009) found that the ownership has negative and significant effect toward the level of voluntary disclosure. When it is connected to the company performance, the research result shows that the concentrated share ownership has positive effect toward the company performance (Thomsen and Pederse, 2000; Perrini, Rossi, and Rovetta, 2008). Furthermore, Lee (2008) and Chen (2006) stated that concentrated ownership initially impacts positively, but the bigger the ownership cause negative impact. Meanwhile, Fishman, Gannon, and Russel (2008) recorded the contrasting result which is the negative effect of the ownership structure toward the company performance. Some previous research shows the effect of ownership structure with the firm value. Shahid (2003) mentioned that the concentrated ownership structure shows the influence toward the measurement of the account performance (ROE and ROA), but not on the performance of the capital market (PER and PBV). Therefore, the information related to ownership structure becomes relevant to concern.

As stated by Haggard, Martin, and Pereira (2008), the policy of company disclosure is effective in increasing the amount of specific information of the company contained in the stock price. That is the result of less asymmetric information derived from more information disclosure. Small asymmetric information is responded positively by the creditor, so that it effects toward decreased cost of capital (Diamond and Verrechia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; in Mardiyah, 2001). Furthermore, Rappaport (1998) uses cost of capital to conduct an analysis of firm value. The cost of capital can be interpreted as an expense issued to pay some expenditure and consists of cost of equity and cost of debt. If both expenses are decreased by the broader information disclosure, then the voluntary disclosure is considered having positive effect toward firm value. The broader the voluntary disclosure is, the higher the firm value.

III. METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

Population and Sample

The population of this study are manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Observation period of the study conducted from 2010 to 2013. There were 139 companies from three sectors of manufacturing industry (basic and chemical industry, miscellaneous industry, consumer goods). Companies sample were selected based on specific criteria (purposive sampling), that are:

- Publish financial statements from 2010 to 2013, and

- Have data the ownership structure, primarily institutional ownership, managerial ownership, voluntary disclosure and corporate value.

Based on the description of the background, problem and objectives, so the hypothesis proposed in this study are as:

H1 : There is relationship between the managerial ownership and the institutional ownership
H2 : There is relationship between the managerial ownership and the voluntary disclosure
H3 : There is relationship between the institutional ownership and the voluntary disclosure
H4 : There are influence of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure toward corporate financial performance both partially and simultaneously.
H5 : There are influence of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure, financial performance toward corporate value.

Based on the results of categorization, only 97 companies that meet the criteria, the rest is based on the results of the evaluation are not included in the study because it has no established criteria. Table 1 is the result of the selection of data that has been done.

Table 1. Group of Samples

Sector	Amount
basic and chemical industry	37 Corporation
miscellaneous industry	31 Corporation
consumer goods industry	29 Corporation
Total sample	97 Corporation

Measurement of variable operationalization in the study are shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Operationalization of Variables

Variable	Sub Variables / Dimensions	Operational definitions	Indicator	Measurement scale
Ownership	Managerial ownership	The percentage of stock ownership by management to the number of shares outstanding	Percentage of ownership by directors	Ratio
	Institutional ownership	The percentage of shares held by institutional parties to the number of shares outstanding	Percentage of ownership by institutions	Ratio
Voluntary disclosure	Voluntary Disclosure Index	Submission of informa - tion provided voluntarily by companies outside the mandatory disclosure	Voluntary disclosure score	Ratio
Financial Performance	Profitability	The company's ability to generate profits on capital used	$ROE = \frac{Net\ Profit}{Total\ Equity}$	Ratio
Corporate value	Market value	Investor perception of the company, which is associated with stock prices. High stock price made the value of the company is also high.	PBV = The market value of shares / book value of equity	Ratio

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design is the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research question. The pland is the overall scheme or program of the research. It includes an outline of what the investigator will do from writing hypotheses and their operational implications to the final analysis of data (Cooper dan Schindler, 2011:140). This study uses an explanatory method, which explains the causal relationship between the variables that affect other variables through hypothesis testing with a quantitative approach, which is aimed to determine the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable (Cooper dan Schiner, 2011:145). This study aimed to determine the effect of ownership structure and voluntary disclosure toward the financial performance and its implications on the corporate value, especially manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange that meet the criteria of the study sample.

The research unit will be observed include the annual financial statements are presented the company in 2010 to 2013, to determine the ownership of the company, financial performance, and voluntary disclosure has been conducted firm sample. As known, the ownership structure of the company proxy for managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Besides derived from the financial statements, ownership structure data were also obtained from other sources that provide data to prove the ownership structure of concentrated ownership structure or pyramidal. Managerial ownership structure is measured by the number or percentage of shares owned by the management of the total outstanding shares, while institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by institutions of the total shares outstanding.

Furthermore, voluntary disclosure of the company measured by the number of items that are revealed by the company outside of the items required to be disclosed. To measure this voluntary disclosure, the researchers calculated the number of items that were disclosed outside the diwajibakan are then given a score. Thus, each company will have different scores are due to the amount of information revealed also different.

The next, firm's financial performance is measured based on accounting data reported to firm. In addition, it also uses market data to measure the performance of firm. Market and accounting data available will also be used to measure firm value.

In this study, more use of secondary data derived either from the internet (websites provided by each firm and by the Indonesia Stock Exchange), as well as by institutions that provide the necessary data in this study. Because the data used is secondary data, then do the collection and recording of data in the period 2010-2013. So that kind of research that can be categorized as a type of causal comparative study aimed to analyze the relationship between variables and independent variables on the dependent variable.

Data Analysis

First, the t-statistic and the F-statistic used to measure the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Second, the research hypothesis testing using path analysis, which was developed as a model to study the effect of directly or indirectly from the exogenous variables on endogenous variables. In this study, path analysis was used to analyze the data obtained, because of the model composed of overlap between the relationships between the number of variables that can be estimated simultaneously. In addition, the dependent variable in a relationship that already exists will be the independent variable in the next relationship.

V. FINDING AND DISCUSSION

1. The Relationship between Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure

The first hypothesis testing by using path analysis conducted to examine the relationship of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure. The results of calculations performed with SPSS software receipts 20:00, obtained correlation variables are presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1. The relationship between X_1 dan X_2; X_1 dan X_3; serta X_2 dan X_3

The results of testing the correlation between independent variables as follows:

a) The correlation coefficient between managerial ownership variable and institutional ownership is -0.036; Based on the size of the correlation coefficient, then the relationship between variables can be expressed correlation with institutional ownership, managerial ownership is negative and very low. This means that if the lower managerial ownership then will be higher institutional ownership.
b) The correlation coefficient between managerial ownership variable and voluntary disclosure is 0.064; Based on the size of the correlation coefficient, then the relationship between variables can be expressed correlation with voluntary disclosure of managerial ownership is positive and very low. This means that if the higher managerial ownership, the voluntary disclosure will be better. These results do not support the research Nephila and Boubaker (2012) who found that managerial ownership is not significantly associated with the

voluntary disclosure. Not influential managerial ownership on voluntary disclosure can be caused due to the percentage of managerial ownership on manufacturing companies in Indonesia are still very small. Low levels of the percentage proportion of share ownership by management tends to result in the management did not come to feel as the owner of the company so that the lack of awareness on the part of management in terms of sacrifice resources to the activities of voluntary disclosure.

c) The correlation coefficient between the variables of institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure is 0.133; Based on the size of the correlation coefficient, then the relationship between variables can be expressed correlation with voluntary disclosure of institutional ownership is positive and very low. This means that if a high institutional ownership, the voluntary disclosure will be better. These results support the research Rauf and Al Aaron (2011) who found that there is a significant relationship between institutional ownership with voluntary disclosure. Same with Rouf and Al Aaron (2011), Nekhilia and Boubakerb (2012) also found a significant relationship between institutional ownership with voluntary disclosure. However, viewed from the positive relation between institutional ownership with voluntary disclosure in companies manufacturing in Indonesia, explained that the difference in the proportion of shares held by outside investors can affect the breadth of disclosure by the company. This is because a growing number of those who need information about the company, the more details that are required to be disclosed and thus more extensive corporate disclosure. So with the increasing number of institutional investors, there will be an increase in the incentive for companies to play an active role in making a voluntary disclosure. With the ownership by outside investors, the disclosures made by the company will be more extensive. High supervision of outside parties against the management will require firms to undertake more extensive disclosures. This is because the financial statements are an important source of information for the company and the information is used in planning and evaluation.

2. The Influence of Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure Partially and Simultaneously On Financial Performance

The second hypothesis testing to test the effect of Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership and voluntary disclosure partially and simultaneously to the financial performance of manufacturing firm in IDX. The influence of managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure partially and simultaneously to the financial performance presented in the table and figure below:

Table 3. Results of Regression Test for Model 1

Variable	Standardized (Beta)	t statistic	Sig.	F
Managerial ownership → Financial performance	-0,076	-2,065	0,039	2,902 (0,034)
Institutional ownership → Financial performance	-0,031	-0,831	0,406	
Voluntary disclosure → Financial performance	0,081	2,200	0,028	

Based on Table 3 the results of the regression test model 1 can be made variable influences the path diagram of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance and can be seen in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2. Diagram the influence of X_1, X_2, dan X_3 on Y

From Figure 2 can also be expressed in the form of structural equation as follows:

$Y = -0{,}076X_1 – 0{,}031X_2 + 0{,}081X_3 + 0{,}994\varepsilon_1$

Where:

Y = Financial performance
X_1 = Managerial ownership
X_2 = Institusional ownership
X_3 = Voluntary disclosure
ε_1 = Other factors that affect Y (variable residues which were not studied)

From the calculation of path analysis presented in the chart and structural equation, the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable can be described as follows.

a. The Influence of Managerial Ownership Partially on Financial Performance

Pointing in table 3 the results of the regression of managerial ownership on the financial performance resulted in t value of -2.065> t table value of 1.967 with a significant P value 0.039 <alpha of 0.05. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. So it can be concluded that managerial ownership significant effect on the financial performance of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Based on the results of path analysis, we can see size of the direct effect of managerial ownership on the financial performance and influence indirectly through institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance can be calculated, as follows.

Table 4. The influence of X_1 on Y

No.	The Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1	Direct effect of X_1 on Y	-0,076*-0,076*100%	=	0,58%
2	Indirect effect through X_2	-0,076*-0,031*-0,036*100%	=	-0,01%
	Indirect effect through X_3	-0,076*0,081*0,064*100%	=	-0,04%
	Total indirect effect	-0,01% + (-0,04%)	=	-0,05%
3	Total effect of variable X_1 on Y	0,58% + (-0,05%)	=	0,53%

The magnitude of the direct effect of managerial ownership variables on the financial performance is 0.58% and the indirect effect through institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance is -0.05%. Thus the total effect of managerial ownership on the financial performance is 0.53%. These results partially support the research Fishman, Gannon, Vinning (2008) that managerial ownership is negatively affecting the performance of firm, in accordance with the management entrenchment hypothesis.Adanya negative influence between managerial ownership and corporate performance in companies listed on the Stock Exchange shows that the shareholders as well as the manager of firm who did not give their best performance in which the board of directors and commissioners still have a personal interest that they preferred more than improving firm's financial performance. This occurs because ownership by managers at firm is still very small proportions that it is possible managers have not yet benefited from such ownership.

b. The Influence of Institutional Ownership Partially on Financial Performance

Pointing in table 3 the results of the regression of institutional ownership on the financial performance resulted in t value of -0.831 <t table value of 1.967 with a significant P value equal to 0.406> 0.05 alpha. Thus Ho: accepted, Ha: rejected. So it can be concluded that institutional ownership has no significant effect on the financial performance of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The amount of direct effect on the financial performance instisional ownership and indirect influence through managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure to the voluntary disclosure variables can be calculated as follows.

Table 5. The influence of X_2 on Y

No.	The Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect of X_2 on Y	-0,031*-0,031*100%	=	0,10%
2.	Indirect effect through X_1	-0,031*-0,076*-0,036*100%	=	-0,01%
	Indirect effect through X_3	-0,031*0,081*0,133*100%	=	-0,03%
	Total indirect effect	-0,01% + (-0,03)	=	-0,04%
3.	Total effect of variable X_2 on Y	0,10% + (-0,04%)	=	0,06%

The amount of direct effect on the financial performance of institutional ownership is 0.10% and the indirect effect through managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance is -0.04%. Thus the total effect of institutional ownership on the financial performance (Y) is 0.06%. The results of this study do not support the research partially Lee (2008) who found that the greater the percentage of shares institutions, the better firm's financial performance. These results indicate that the control function of institutional shareholders is not maximized or in other words, institutional investors have not been professionally monitor the development of investment in companies listed on the Stock Exchange, so the owner of firm can not control the behavior of management in order to act in accordance with the objectives of the company that will eventually improve the financial performance of the company.

c. The Influence of Voluntary Disclosure Partially on The Financial Performance

Pointing in table 3 the results of the regression voluntary disclosure on the financial performance resulted in t value of 2.200 > 1.967 t table with a significant P value equal to the value of 0.028 < alpha of 0.05. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. So it can be concluded that the voluntary disclosure significant effect on the financial performance of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The magnitude of the direct influence of the variable variable voluntary disclosure of financial performance and influence indirectly through variable managerial ownership and institutional ownership of the financial performance variables can be calculated as follows.

Table 6. The influence of X_3 on Y

No.	Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect of X_3 on Y	0,081*0,081*100%	=	0,66%
2.	Indirect effect through X_1	0,081*-0,076*0,064*100%	=	-0,04%
	Indirect effect through X_2	0,081*-0,031*0,133*100%	=	-0,03%
	Total indirect effect	-0,04% + (-0,03%)	=	-0,07%
3.	Total effect of variable X_3 on Y	0,66% + (-0,07%)	=	0,59%

The magnitude of the direct effect of variables voluntary disclosure on the financial performance is 0.66% and the indirect effect through variable managerial ownership and institutional ownership variable financial performance is -0.07. Thus the total effect the voluntary disclosure on the financial performance is 0.59%. These results support the research Zarb (2007) that the better the firm makes a voluntary disclosure, the better firm's financial performance.

d. The Influence of Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure Simultaneously on The Financial Performance

Pointing in table 3 the results of the regression of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure generate value P value of 0.034 <alpha of 0.05 with an F statistic of 2.902> F table 2,60. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. That is, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure jointly significant effect on financial performance. The magnitude of the direct effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance and effect indirectly through the variables X1, X2 and X3 on the financial performance can be calculated as shown in the following table:

Table 7. The influence of X_1, X_2 and X_3 on Y

No.	Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1	Direct effect			
	X_1 on Y	-0,076*-0,076*100%	=	0,58%
	X_2 on Y	-0,031*-0,031*100%	=	0,10%
	X_3 on Y	0,081*0,081*100%	=	0,66%
	Total direct effect	0,58% + 0,10% + 0,66%		1,34%
2	Indirect effect:		=	
	Through X_1 and X_2	-0,076*-0,031*-0,036*100%	=	-0,01%
	Through X_1 and X_3	-0,076*0,081*0,064*100%	=	-0,04%
	Through X_2 and X_3	-0,031*0,081*0,133*100%	=	-0,03%
	Total indirect effect	-0,01% + -0,04% + -0,03%	=	-0,08%
3	Total effect of variable X_1,X_2, X_3 on Y	1,34% + -0,08%	=	1,26%

The magnitude of the direct effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance is 1.34% and the indirect effect of each variable through managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure to the financial performance variables is -0.08%. Thus the total effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on the financial performance is 1.26%. From the calculation results in Table 3 it can be seen that the total effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and managerial disclosure on the financial performance is 1.26%.

3. The Influence of Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Performance Partially or Simultaneously on the Firm Value

The third hypothesis testing by using path analysis was conducted to test effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance and simultaneous partial on the value firm in manufacturing companies on the Stock Exchange. The results of calculations performed using SPSS 20:00, obtained results interverning independent variables and the dependent variable, as presented in the table and figure below:

Table 8. Results of Regression Test Model 2

Variabel	Standardized (Beta)	t statistic	Sig.	F
Managerial ownership → Firm value	-0,246	-5,054	0,000	14,953 (0,000)
Institutional ownership → Firm value	0,107	2,187	0,029	
Voluntary disclosure → Firm value	0,155	3,159	0,002	
Financial performance → Firm value	-0,234	-4,798	0,000	

Based on Table 8 the results of regression in model 2 can be made variable influence diagram manajerian ownership, institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure, and financial performance on firm value in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The effect the path diagram can be seen in Figure 3 below.



Figure 3. Diagram the influence of variable X_1, X_2, X_3 serta Y on Z

In addition, the calculation results in Figure 3 can also be expressed in the form of structural equation as follows:

$Z = -0{,}246X_1 + 0{,}107X_2 + 0{,}155X_3 - 0{,}234Y + 0{,}927\varepsilon 2$

Where:

Z = Firm value

Y= Financial performance

X_1 = Managerial ownership

X_2= Institutional ownership

X_3= Voluntary disclosure

ε2 = other factors that affect the Y and Z (variable residues which were not studied)

From the calculation of path analysis, as used in the chart and structural equation, the influence of the variables X1, X2, X3 and Y to Z partially and simultaneously will be described below.

a. The Influence of Partial Managerial Ownership on Firm Value

Based on the results of Table 8 Regression managerial ownership on firm value produces t value of -5.054> t table value of 1.967 with a significant p value of 0.000 <alpha of 0.05. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. So it can be concluded that managerial ownership significant effect on the value of firm in the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The magnitude of the direct effect managerial ownership variable to variable value of firm and an indirect influence through institutional ownership variable, voluntary disclosure and financial performance of the variable value of firm can be calculated, as follows.

Table 9. The influence of X_1 on Z

No.	Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect of X_1 on Z	-0,246*-0,246*100%	=	6,05%
2.	Indirect effect through X_2	-0,246*0,107*-0,036*100%	=	0,09%
	Indirect effect through X_3	-0,246*0,155*0,064*100*	=	-0,24%
	Indirect effect through Y	-0,246*-0,234*-0,063*100%	=	-0,36%
	Total indirect effect	0,09% + (-0,24%) + (-0,36%)	=	-0,51%
3.	Total effect of variable X_1 on Z	6,05% + (-0,51%)	=	5,54%

The magnitude of the direct effect managerial ownership on firm value is 6.05% and the indirect effect through institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure and financial performance of the company's value was -0.51%. Thus the total effect managerial ownership on firm value is 5.54%. The results of this study do not support the research partially Wahyudi, Pawestri (2005) that the higher managerial ownership, the higher the value of firm. The different findings expressed by Amri (2008) that managerial ownership is positively related to the value of firm. These results also do not support the idea Jensen and Meckling (1976) where the greater ownership by management, the stronger the tendency of management to optimize the use of resources dayasehingga resulting increase in the value of firm.

b. The Influence of Partial Institutional Ownership on Firm Value

Pointing in table 8 regression results of institutional ownership on firm value produces t value of 2.187> 1.967 t table with a significant P value equal to the value of 0.029 <alpha of 0.05. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. So it can be concluded that institutional ownership significant effect on the value of firm in the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The magnitude of the direct effect of institutional ownership on firm value and indirect influence through managerial ownership, voluntary disclosure and financial performance of the company's value can be calculated, as follows.

Table 10. The influence of X_2 on Z

No.	The Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect of X_2 on Z	0,107*0,107*100%	=	1,14%
2.	Indirect effect through X_1	0,107*-0,246*-0,036*100%	=	0,09%
	Indirect effect through X_3	0,107*0,155*0,133*100%	=	0,22%
	Indirect effect through Y	0,107*-0,234*-0,020*100%	=	0,05%
	Total indirect effect	0,09% + 0,22% + 0,05%	=	0,36%
3.	Total effect of variable X_2 on Z	1,14% + 0,36%	=	1,50%

The magnitude of the direct effect of institutional ownership on firm value is 1.14% and the indirect effect through managerial ownership, voluntary disclosure and financial performance of the firm value was 0.36%. Thus the total effect institutional ownership on firm value is 1.50%. The results of this study partially supports research Amri (2008) that the greater ownership by institutions, the higher the firm value. Similar findings were also found by Lastanti (2004) that institutional ownership is positively related to the value of firm. These results indicate that high institutional ownership in manufacturing companies on the Stock Exchange can effectively monitor the firm, so that the manager will be efficient in the use of corporate assets. From the results it was concluded that a large number of shareholders who proved to be effective in monitoring the behavior of managers in perusahaan.Hal this is due to the asymmetry of information between investors and managers, investors do not necessarily have the information fully owned by managers (as the manager of firm) so the manager is difficult to control by institutional investors.

c. The Influence of Voluntary Disclosure Partially on the Firm Value

Based on the results of Table 8 Regression voluntary disclosure of the firm value produces t value of 3.159> 1.967 t table with a significant P value equal to the value of 0.002 <alpha of 0.05. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. So it can be concluded that the voluntary disclosure significant effect on the firm value in the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The magnitude of the direct effect voluntary disclosure on the firm value and an indirect influence through managerial ownership, institutional ownership and financial performance of the company's value can be calculated, as follows.

Table 11. The influence of X_3 on Z

No.	The Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect X_3 on Z	0,155*0,155*100%	=	2,40%
2.	Indirect effect through X_1	0,155*-0,246* 0,064*100%	=	-0,24%
	Indirect effect through X_2	0,155*0,107* 0,133*100%	=	0,22%
	Indirect effect through Y	0,155*-0,234* 0,078*100%	=	-0,28%
	Total indirect effect	-0,24% + 0,22% - 0,28%	=	-0,30%
3.	Total effect of variable X_3 on Z	2,40% +(- 0,30%)	=	2,10%

The magnitude of the direct effect the voluntary disclosure of the firm value was 2.40% and the indirect effect through managerial ownership, institutional ownership and financial performance of the company's value was -0.30%. Thus the total voluntary disclosure to firm value is 2.10%. The results of this study partially supports research Zarb (2007) that the wider firm makes a voluntary disclosure, the better the firm value.

d. The influence of financial performance partially on firm value

Pointing to the table 8 regression results, financial performance variable on the firm value produces t value of -4.798> t table 1.967 with significant value P values of 0.000 <alpha of 0.05. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. So it can be concluded that the financial performance significantly influence the firm value on the companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The magnitude of the direct effect of the financial performance on firm value, and the indirect effect through variable managerial ownership, institutional performance and voluntary disclosure on corporate value can be calculated, as follows.

Table 12. The influence of Y on Z

No.	The Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect of Y on Z	-0,234*-0,234*100%	=	5,48%
2.	Indirect effect through X_1	-0,234* -0,246* -0,063*100%	=	0,36%
	Indirect effect through X_2	-0,234* 0,107* -0,020*100%	=	0,05%
	Indirect effect through X_3	-0,234%*0,155* 0,078*100%	=	-0,28%
	Total indirect effect	0,36% + 0,05% - 0,28%	=	0,13%
3.	Total effect of variable Y on Z	5,48% + 0,13%	=	5,61%

The magnitude of the direct effect the financial performance on variable firm value was 5.48% and the indirect effect through managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on firm value was 0.13%. Therefore, the total effect on the value firm's financial performance is 5.61%. The results of this study support the research Lastanti (2004) who found that the company's financial performance significantly influence the firm value, where the better the company's ability to generate return on assets or capital employed will greatly affect investors' perception on firm so that the company's value can be increased or decreased.

e. The Influence of Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Performance Simultaneously on Firm Value

Pointing in table 8 regression results managerial ownership, institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure, and financial performance generates value P value of 0.000 <alpha 0.05 by F statistic of 14.953> F table 2,60. Thus Ho: rejected, Ha: accepted. That is, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure, and financial performance jointly significant effect on the value of firm on the companies listed on the Stock Exchange Indonesia.Besarnya direct effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance on firm value and indirect influence through the variables X1, X2 and X3 and (Y) on the value firm can be calculated as shown in the following table:

Table 13. The influence of X_1, X_2, X_3, and Y on Z

No.	The Effect	The Effect Magnitude		
1.	Direct effect			
	X_1 on Z	-0,246*-0,246*100%	=	6,05%
	X_2 on Z	0,107*0,107*100%	=	1,14%
	X_3 on Z	0,155*0,155*100%	=	2,40%
	Y on Z	-0,234*-0,234*100%	=	5,48%
	Total direct effect	6,05% + 1,14% + 2,40% + 5,48%	=	15,07%
2.	Indirect effect:			
	Through X_1 and X_2	-0,070*-0,034*-0,036*100%	=	-0,01%
	Through X_1 and X_3	-0,070*0,087*0,064*100%	=	-0,04%
	Through X_1 and Y	-0,246*-0,234*-0,063*100%	=	-0,36%
	Through X_2 and X_3	0,107*0,155*0,133*100%	=	0,22%
	Through X_2 and Y	0,107*-0,234*-0,020*100%	=	0,05%
	Through X_3 and Y	0,155*-0,234* 0,078*100%	=	-0,28%
	Total indirect effect	-0,01% - 0,04% - 0,36% + 0,22% + 0,05% - 0,28%	=	-0,42%
3.	Total effect of variables $X_{1,}X_2$, X_3 and Y on Z	15,08% - 0,42%	=	14,65%

The magnitude of the direct effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance on value of firm is 15.07% and the indirect effect of each through managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance on firm value is-0.42%. Thus the total effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance on firm value are 14.65%. From the results of the calculations in Table 13 it can be seen that the total effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance on firm value is 14.65%. From the results of the calculations in Table 13 it can be seen that the total effect managerial ownership, institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure and financial performance on value of firm is 14.65%. Managerial ownership and financial performance has a dominant influence on the firm value compared to the other two variables institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure. This is indicated by the magnitude of effect managerial ownership and financial performance on firm value respectively by 6.05% and 5.48%. While the amount of effect institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure on value of their respective companies amounted to only 1.14% and 2,40%.

VI. CONCLUSION

1) The relationship between managerial ownership and institutional ownership of listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange is in the low category and have a negative relationship.
2) The relationship between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure of listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange is in the low category and have a positive relationship.
3) The relationship between Institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure of listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange is in the low category and have a positive relationship.
4) Managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure have significant effect on the financial performance partially, whereas institutional ownership has no significant effect on the financial performance. Simultaneously managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and voluntary disclosure have significant effect on financial performance
5) Managerial ownership, institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure and financial performance havea significant effect on corporate value either partially or simultaneously.

VII. RECOMMENDATION

1) Recommendations for academics
   a. For further research suggested extending the relevant variables such as involving variables concentrated ownership, ownership dispersion, the existence of an audit committee, independent directors, the size of the board of directors, extending the research time and attention to the relevance of information that needs to be disclosed to the public.
   b. Opportunities wide open for further research to explore other factors that may affect the financial performance and the value of the company.
2) Recommendations for company:
   From the results of the study found that ownership by institutions and voluntary disclosures have a significant effect on firm value. Therefore, it is suggested to companies to magnify institutional ownership, because ownership by providing a larger share to the institution will be able to control the company well. Thus the management will run the company with the interests of the company rather than personal interests so that the company will be easier to achieve optimum performance. In addition, the company also needs to be more open in disclosing all information relating to both financial and non-financial public. Thus, companies are being more transparent, will give birth to a positive perception among investors that the company is in good condition so that the company will increase the value of which is reflected in an increase in the market price of the company's stock.
3) Recommendations for investors:

It is recommended to investors, before making an investment in the capital market, especially in manufacturing companies should pay attention to the pattern of ownership structure and the extent of disclosure sukarela.Karena proven effective both of these factors could affect the company's stock price in the market, which in turn will affect the rate of return that would be obtained by investors.

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