

## **The phenomenon of corruption at a global level**

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### **Abstract**

*Corruption is a major issue all around the world, being a widely spread phenomenon in all the countries. The few cases in which corruption has been eradicated leads to the conclusion that this scourge is a persistent one, very difficult to remove once in place. Global economy has to deal with an increasing level of corruption, and bribes amount to circa 1.5 trillions of dollars every year or around 5% of the global GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund.*

*During this project, an econometric research has been completed, concerning the factors that generate corruption and the correlation between them. We have been analyzing the influence of the following independent variables: involvement and responsibility, political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism, the governance effectiveness, the quality of regulations, the rule of law and the control of corruption on the dependent variable "Corruption Perception Index"(CPI) in 176 countries. To determine to which extent the independent variables contribute to modifying the dependent variable, we have elaborated a simple linear regression model and have determined if this can be considered as valid, if there is or not a linear connection between CPI and the six independent variables.*

**Key words:** corruption, global indicators of governance, corruption perception index, Quality of Regulations, Control of Corruption

Classification JEL: C40, D12, O12

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### **I. Introduction**

Using the most common and simple definition, corruption represents the abusive use of power in order to satisfy some personal or group interests. As an antisocial act, corruption is widely spread in society, being extremely detrimental to development, because it favors the interests of individuals, especially in the economy, affecting the collective interest through: appropriation, misappropriation and use of public resources for personal interest, occupation of public functions by using preferential relationships, concluding transactions by circumventing moral and legal norms (Colas, 2003).

Corruption happens on the national and international level, both in the public and private sector, as well as in between these two. Corruption is a „complex and multifaceted phenomenon, with multiple causes and effects, because it has various forms and functions in different contexts” (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001). Literature traditionally distinguishes between various types of corruption: bribes, including “commissions”, gratuities, commercial arrangements, tips, gifts or payments with no legal documents, made in order to obtain advantages or the urgent processing of some documents and/or rapid decision making, embezzlement and misappropriation, fraud, extortion, blackmail, protection fees, evasion, donations, favoritism, nepotism (Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2002). In the public sector, there is a distinction made between political corruption (Moody-Stuart, 1997) and bureaucratic corruption (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001). An interesting distinction has also been made between economical corruption, which implies the cash or merchandise exchange, and social corruption, which includes clientele preferences, nepotism, ethnicity and other favoritisms (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001).

Corruption is a complex phenomenon, which almost never can be attributed to a single cause. Thus, the fight against corruption can't be based on a strategy excessively directed to a single area, as for example increasing the salaries in the public sector, increasing fines or only creating an anti-corruption institution. (Tanzi, 1998).

Corruption can be found at various levels: there is corruption in the small favors in between a small number of people (the small corruption), there is the corruption that affects the high level government official

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(the great corruption), as well as corruption that is present in the day to day social life (systemic corruption), including the corruption which allows the existence of organized crime networks.

Systemic or endemic corruption is the one based primarily on the weak points of an organization or system (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2011). This system can be opposite to some officials or agents who act corruptively as individuals within the system. Factors, which encourage the systemic corruption, are: internal conflicts, discretionary powers, monopole powers, and the lack of transparency, low salaries and a culture of impunity (Alcazar and Andrade, 2001).

Specific corruption acts are taking a bribe, blackmail and embezzlement, in a system where “corruption becomes the rule, more than an exception” (Heinzpeter, 2009). In “Corruption and the secret of law: a legal anthropological perspective” (Nuijten and Anders, 2007) the authors make a distinction between systemic centralized and decentralized corruption, according to the level of state or government where corruption takes place. In some countries, as the post-soviet ones, both types of corruption can be found, the small and the systemic corruption (Legvold, 2009).

Although the narrowing of definition covered areas could induce the risk of ignoring certain parts of the problem, the majority of authors understand corruption as being the abusive use of public resources in order to obtain personal advantages or any type of private power, or any political advantages that can result from a public servants behavior which is non-ethical and unlawful (Khan, 1996).

Hunter and Shah (2000) developed, according to the following table, a useful framework for distributing priorities according to corruption incidence and governance quality, underlining that effectiveness of anti-corruption policies is specific to every country, some policies can be effective in the countries with low quality of governance, while others can be more appropriate where the governance quality is high.

**Table no. 1 – Effectiveness of anti-corruption governance quality based programs**

Incidence of corruption	Governance quality	Priorities of anti-corruption efforts (based on Corruption Drivers)
High	Poor	Establishing rule of law, consolidating institutions of participation and responsibility; limiting the governmental intervention to focus on base aspects of the mandate
Medium	Medium	decentralizing and reforming economical policies; results and valuation oriented management; introducing stimulants to supply competitive public services
Low	Good	Explicit anti-corruption programs, as anti-corruption agencies; strengthening the financial management, increasing public servant conscience; NO BRIBE, controlling corruption on the higher social levels etc

Source: Hunter and Shah, 2000:12

With a global bribe level estimated at circa 80 billion dollars a year, (Ferrell et al., 2002), corruption and non-ethical behavior are very actual terms. For example, in the corporate environment, objectives are not only about productivity and profitability, but also, equally about ethics and obeying the legal and moral standards. Taking into account the success of some corporations where ethics and corruption prevention are concerned, some observers suggest that practices and elements of corporate culture could be seen as inspiration sources in fighting corruption (Altman, 1998), although these are shadowed by big cases of fraud as Enron (2001), the telecommunication company WorldCom (2002), Tyco (2002)- Swiss security systems company based in New Jersey, HealthSouth Corporation (2003) – one of the US main suppliers of medical services, American International Group (AIG)-2005-multinational insurance company, Lehman Brothers (2008), Satyam (2009) – IT and accounting company.

As Adam Lindgreen mentions in „Corruption and Unethical Behavior: Report on a set of Danish guidelines” (2004), throughout the years, „The Economist” reflected the importance and spread of corruption, and the high number of cases, which indicates the fact that not every company observes ethical and moral standards. For example, the looting of 14 million USD after the privatization of the main bank (BCM) of Mozambique (The Economist, November 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2002); the disappearance, between 1998 and 2002, of 4,3 billion dollars from the state funds of Angola, the sum being equal to one tenth of the country’s GDP

(The Economist, October 26<sup>th</sup>, 2002). For the whole African continent, the level of corruption is estimated at about 150 billion dollars a year (The Economist, September 21<sup>st</sup>, 2002).

In the paper "Causes and Effects of Corruption: What Has Past Decade's Empirical Research Taught Us? a Survey" (Dimant and Tosato, 2017) authors identify as causes of corruption: monopolies of markets, as well as political monopolies; low level of democracy, low level of civil participation and low political transparency; high level of bureaucracy and inefficient administrative structures; low freedom of the press; low

economical freedom; high ethnical separation and high level of favoritism within the group; gender inequality; low level of integration to the global economy; government over sizing; low level of governmental decentralization; big natural resources; poverty; political instability; weak property laws; contamination from corrupt neighboring countries; low level of education; limited access to the internet.

Robert Klitgaard (Klitgaard, 1998) claims that corruption appears when the gain from corruption is higher than the penalty multiplied by the risk of being caught and criminally investigated.

### **The corrupt percentage > Penalty × Probability of being caught and criminally investigated**

There are long term goals in the fight against corruption, and these include combinations of internal and international actions, inspired by the success of other states, as the following: reducing the dependency of citizens on the state; considering the reducing of employees in the state system, on public payroll, and reducing the state controlled resources, respectively; constructing mechanisms of free competition. Also, the international community should maintain a strong external pressure, in order to cause a higher responsibility and transparency (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). Elliot (1997) in his paper "Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations " finds a reversed relationship between the size of the budget and corruption, stating that privatization in some countries (for e.g. Russia) led to the growth of corruption and exploitation (Elliott KA. ,1997).

Studies and polls conducted in order to measure the degree of corruption bring an increase of corruption awareness and create the necessary premises to fight this scourge. Thus, instruments to evaluate the fight against corruption are created, as well as the specific methods to use for that purpose.

„TRACE International” NGO classifies corruption risks (Global Business Bribery Risk Index), as being an alternative of Corruption Perception Index done by Transparency International (Global Business Bribery Risk Index, TRACE International, Inc.). The study conducted in 2006 by TRACE International shows that, although the legislative framework and the measures taken to fight corruption are on the rise in many countries, the global situation grows worse. About 60% of the countries have a higher bribery risk compared to the study conducted in 2014, while only 32% have a low bribery risk.

According to Transparency International (2017), corruption affects all the states of the world. It varies from a country to the other, in both nature and intensity, according to each region's specific. Corruption as a phenomenon is influenced by a large number of factors, the most relevant of these being the six global indicators of governance which succeed in supplying comparable data on governance for a large number of countries and which constitute a stimulant for certain countries to implement reforms in order to improve the governance quality, as a means to fight this scourge.

## **II. Research Methods**

The present study aims to establish the forms corruption can take, from the perspective of global governance indicators and to analyze the influence of these factors upon the Corruption Perception index (CPI).

Corruption is largely perceived as being connected to state activities, to the way it functions and reaches its purpose. Thus, are considered to be extremely important factors as: freedom of association, freedom of the press, political stability, the extent people can participate in the election of government, the freedom of speech, the efficacy of government measures, the quality of public services and the degree of independence from political pressure, the trust in the judicial system, in the public security system, in the warrantee of constitutional rights and the trust in the way corruption control is ensured. To this end, data pertaining to 2016 has been collected, regarding the level of corruption in 176 states, from all continents and CPI compared to the six global governance indicators has been analyzed:

- Voice and Accountability reflects the perception of the extent to which citizens can participate in electing the government, as well as the freedom of speech, the freedom of association or the freedom of the press.
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions concerning the probability that a government could be overthrown by violent or unconstitutional means (including acts of terrorism).
- Government Effectiveness reflects perception of the public services quality and the degree of independence from political pressure, as well as the quality of public policies elaboration and implementation or the governments' credibility regarding its engagement to implement these policies.
- Regulatory Quality reflects the perception on the governments' capacity to formulate and implement viable policies and solid regulations which allow and promote private sectors' development.
- Rule of Law regards the perception of the extent to which state agents trust and respect social norms, especially when it comes to the quality of contract executions, property laws, police and courts, as well as the probability of crime and violence.

➤ Control of Corruption reflects the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for personal gain (aiming at both the small and great corruption), as well as the “capture” of the state by the elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al, 2010).

The study also aims to establish, at the level of 2016, the influence that the six global governance indicators have on the level of corruption perception in the 176 countries included in the Annex no. 1.

### III. The analysis of the research

The study has been completed using the method of simple and multiple regression, analyzing, on the level of 2016, the influence the six independent variables: *Voice and Accountability* (x1), *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism* (x2), *Government Effectiveness* (x3), *Regulatory Quality* (x4), *Rule of Law*(x5), *Control of Corruption* (x6) have on the dependent variable *Corruption Perception Index* (y) in 176 countries. The following table realizes a descriptive analysis of the six variables, based on the data of the 176 countries.

For this, the validity of the coefficients' magnitude will be tested according to the two working hypotheses:

H0 :  $\beta_i = 0$  (statistically not significant) (1)

H1 :  $\beta_i \neq 0$  (statistically significant) (2)

where:

i=1,2 and  $\beta$  – slope of the regression line

The significance threshold is 5%, and to exclude the possibility of running a false regression, the value of the R2 coefficient is compared to the Durbin Watson statistic.

The next table presents a descriptive analysis of the six variables, based on the data from the 176 countries, done using Descriptive Statistics in Excel.

Table no. 2 – Descriptive analysis:

CPI 2016	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption							
Mean	42,94886	Mean	47,05553	Mean	44,68074	Mean	48,39653	Mean	48,48121	Mean	47,01978	Mean	46,81764
Standard Error	1,465098	Standard Error	2,15673	Standard Error	2,072473	Standard Error	2,197235	Standard Error	2,219474	Standard Error	2,206449	Standard Error	2,214949
Median	38	Median	45,07389	Median	43,09524	Median	48,31731	Median	48,07692	Median	44,95192	Median	44,47116
Minimum	10	Minimum	0	Minimum	0	Minimum	0	Minimum	0	Minimum	0	Minimum	0,480769
Maximum	90	Maximum	100	Maximum	99,52381	Maximum	100	Maximum	100	Maximum	100	Maximum	100
Sum	7559	Sum	8281,773	Sum	7863,81	Sum	8517,788	Sum	8532,692	Sum	8275,481	Sum	8239,904
Count	176	Count	176	Count	176	Count	176	Count	176	Count	176	Count	176

Done by the authors, according to their own calculations.


From Table no. 2 results that Regulatory Quality is the factor that most influences corruption perception. Control of Corruption represents only 46.81 % from the Corruption Perception Index, which demonstrates the inefficacy of this battle in all the states of the world.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism proved to be the less influential factor, with only 44.68%. Standard Error of Average is between 2.07 – 2.2194 minimum (the lowest value of the variable is zero for all parameters, except Control of Corruption, who’s value is 0.4807). Maximum represents the highest value of the variable in the absolute value of 100 found in all independent variables, except the independent variable (x2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. Count represents the number of countries included in this study, 176.


The approximation of the model of the link between the variables is the most frequently used method constituting the graphical representation of the value strings using the correlogram. The correlogram represents the connection of the Corruption Perception Index to each independent variable.

Charts – Connections between variables:


Grafic 1. CPI 2016/ Voice and Accountability




Grafic 2. CPI 2016/ Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism



Grafic 3. CPI 2016/Government Effectiveness



Grafic 4. CPI 2016/Regulatory Quality



Charts done by the authors according to their own calculations

By analyzing the six charts, it is noted that in Chart no. 6 - CPI/Control of Corruption there is the strongest linear connection, resulting the strong impact this indicator of global governance has on the Corruption Perception Index, on a global level.

For the relevance of the research we also used the Regression ( Anova) analysis instrument in Excel, which, combined with the other instrument, can create a clear image of global corruption perception.

**Table no. 3-Correlation coefficients for the six independent variables**

SUMMARY OUTPUT

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0,973347832
R Square	0,947406003
Adjusted R Squ	0,94553876
Standard Error	4,535933276
Observations	176

ANOVA

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	6	62635,41705	10439,23617	507,3824114	2,7586E-105
Residual	169	3477,122726	20,57469069		
Total	175	66112,53977			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95,0%	Upper 95,0%
Intercept	11,45918008	0,720240329	15,91021721	2,00683E-35	10,03735335	12,88100681	10,03735335	12,88100681
X Variable 1	0,064300918	0,020900116	3,076581848	0,002443129	0,02304199	0,105559847	0,02304199	0,105559847
X Variable 2	0,035176135	0,02174507	1,617660207	0,107600777	-0,007750817	0,078103086	-0,007750817	0,078103086
X Variable 3	0,03586547	0,044092244	0,813419025	0,417122372	-0,051177046	0,122907986	-0,051177046	0,122907986
X Variable 4	0,003499199	0,037453455	0,093427932	0,925674269	-0,070437683	0,077436081	-0,070437683	0,077436081
X Variable 5	0,057980478	0,052819255	1,0977148	0,27389058	-0,046290035	0,162250991	-0,046290035	0,162250991
X Variable 6	0,475475432	0,040868152	11,6343756	2,34705E-23	0,394797596	0,556153268	0,394797596	0,556153268

Source: Done by the authors according to their own calculations

By analyzing Table no. 3, frame 1, it is noted that Multiple R, the multiple coefficient of correlation, has the value 0.973347832, over 0, meaning that between the fix variable Y and the independent variables X1...X6 there is a direct connection.

RSquare (R2) / this coefficient represents the rapport between the frequency variance CPI Y, through the six independent variables, and has a value comprised in the 0-1 interval, more precisely 0.947406003 (94%). The closest this value gets to 1, the strongest the connection of the six independent variables is. Standard Error, the statistic term, which measures the precision of the research, in our case, has a value of 4.535933276.

In Table no. 2 - frame 2 the coefficient SignificanceF is noted, this representing a critical unilateral probability and being interpreted according to the threshold coefficient  $\alpha = 0.05$ . In our case, this coefficient has a value of 2.7586E-105, which leads to the conclusion that variables X1...X6 have a great influence on variable Y.

Two versions are taken into account:

SignificanceF >  $\alpha$ , in which case we can't reject the hypothesis, sufficient reasons to reject the null H0 being present, if this H0 statistically represents the regression model, this one is not valid

SignificanceF <  $\alpha$  the null hypothesis is being rejected, the H1 hypothesis remaining acceptable.

Statistically, the result is significant, and the regression model is valid.

In our analysis  $\alpha = 0.05$  and SignificanceF is 2.7586E-105, results that SignificanceF <  $\alpha$ , the H0 hypothesis gets rejected and H1 accepted, statistically, the model is valid. The conclusion is that x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6 significantly influence the y variable.

In frame 3, Lower 95% and Upper 95% parameters are the inferior and superior limit to which the researched parameter can be reliable.

In order to conduct a more laborious research of this phenomenon, we used Eviews program and the information comprised in table no. 4 - Ranking of world states according to their Control of Corruption indicator. Research thus conducted strengthened previous studies realized by Regression in Excel, proving this time also that the

decisive element in increasing or decreasing the perception of corruption as a phenomenon is the Control of Corruption done by the authorized institutions from the states under scrutiny, as results from Chart 7, lower down, Control of Corruption versus CPI.

Chart 7- Distribution of CPI on Control of Corruption 2016





Table no. 4- Ranking of world states according to the indicator Control of Corruption

#	Country	Control of Corruption Rank	#	Country	Control of Corruption Rank	#	Country	Control of Corruption Rank	#	Country	Control of Corruption Rank
1	New Zealand	100.00	45	Saint Lucia	70.67	89	Colombia	44.23	133	Bangladesh	21.15
2	Finland	99.52	46	Dominica	70.19	90	Islands Solomon	43.75	134	Kazakhstan	20.67
3	Denmark	99.04	47	Grenada	69.71	91	Peru	43.27	135	Sierra Leone	20.19
4	Sweden	98.56	48	Spain	68.75	92	Indonesia	42.79	136	Ukraine	19.71
5	Norway	98.08	49	Czech Republic	67.79	93	Zambia	42.31	137	Pakistan	19.23
6	Luxembourg	97.60	50	Latvia	67.31	94	Vietnam	41.83	138	Russia	18.75
7	Singapore	97.12	51	Korea (South)	66.83	95	Albania	41.35	139	Mozambique	18.27
8	Switzerland	96.15	52	Oman	66.35	96	Thailand	40.87	140	Azerbaijan	17.79
9	Iceland	95.67	53	Namibia	65.87	97	Kosovo	40.38	141	Nicaragua	17.31
10	Canada	95.19	54	Mauritius	65.38	98	Ethiopia	39.90	142	Kenya	16.83
11	Netherlands	94.71	55	Jordan	64.42	99	Brazil	38.46	143	Madagascar	16.35
12	United Kingdom	94.23	56	Slovakia	63.46	100	Bosnia and Herzegovina	37.02	144	Papua New Guinea	15.87
13	Germany	93.75	57	Saudi Arabia	62.98	101	Benin	36.54	145	Guinea	15.38
14	Australia	93.27	58	Croatia	62.50	102	Panama	36.06	146	Laos	14.90
15	Ireland	92.79	59	Malaysia	61.54	103	Mongolia	35.58	147	Guinea	14.90
16	Belgium	92.31	60	Hungary	61.06	104	Tanzania	35.10	148	Moldova	14.42
17	Hong Kong	91.83	61	Cuba	60.58	105	Timor-Leste	34.62	149	Lebanon	13.94
18	Austria	91.35	62	South Africa	60.10	106	Philippines	34.13	150	Nigeria	13.46
19	Japan	90.87	63	Italy	59.62	107	Côte d'Ivoire	33.65	151	Uganda	12.98
20	France	90.38	64	Romania	58.17	108	El Salvador	33.17	152	Tajikistan	12.50
	The United States of									Kyrgyzstan	12.02

21	America	89.90	65	Lesotho	57.69	109	Armenia	32.69	153	Eritrea	11.54
22	Uruguay	89.42	66	Senegal	57.21	110	Egypt	32.21	154	Cameroon	11.06
23	United Arab Emirates	88.46	67	Greece	56.73	111	Comoros	31.73	155	Burundi	10.58
24	Barbados	87.98	68	Bahrain	56.25	112	Niger	31.25	156	Uzbekistan	10.10
25	Estonia	84.62	69	Sao Tome and Principe	55.29	113	Myanmar	30.77	157	Congo	9.62
26	Bhutan	83.17	70	Montenegro	54.33	114	Djibouti	30.29	158	Central African Republic	9.13
27	Bahamas	82.69	71	Tunisia	53.85	115	Mali	29.81	159	Zimbabwe	8.65
28	Chile	82.21	72	Burkina Faso	53.37	116	Ecuador	29.33	160	Cambodia	8.17
29	Israel	81.73	73	Morocco	52.88	117	Maldives	28.85	161	The Democratic Republic of Congo	7.69
30	Portugal	80.77	74	Jamaica	51.92	118	Togo	28.37	162	Haiti	7.21
31	Botswana	80.29	75	Bulgaria	51.44	119	Honduras	27.88	163	Venezuela	6.73
32	Qatar	79.81	76	Ghana	50.96	120	Algeria	27.40	164	Iraq	6.25
33	Cape Verde	79.33	77	Turkey	50.48	121	Bolivia	26.92	165	Angola	5.77
34	Taiwan	78.85	78	Kuwait	50.00	122	Liberia	26.44	166	Korea (North)	5.29
35	Cyprus	77.88	79	China	49.04	123	Iran	25.96	167	Chad	4.81
36	Slovenia	77.40	80	Trinidad and Tobago	48.56	124	Guatemala	25.48	168	Turkmenistan	4.33
37	Poland	76.44	81	Sri Lanka	48.08	125	Paraguay	25.00	169	Guinea-Bissau	3.85
38	Malta	75.96	82	Belarus	47.60	126	Gabon	24.52	170	Afghanistan	3.37
39	Costa Rica	75.48	83	India	47.12	127	Malawi	24.04	171	Libya	2.88
40	Rwanda	74.52	84	The FYR of Macedonia	46.63	128	Nepal	23.56	172	Syria	2.40
41	Saint Vincent and The Grenadines	74.04	85	Argentina	46.15	129	Mexico	23.08	173	South Sudan	1.92
42	Georgia	73.56	86	Serbia	45.67	130	Dominican Republic	22.60	174	Sudan	1.44
43	Lithuania	73.08	87	Guyana	45.19	131	Gambia	22.12	175	Yemen	0.96
44	Brunei	72.60	88	Suriname	44.71	132	Mauritania	21.63	176	Somalia	0.48

World map from the perspective of Control of Corruption governance indicator, drawn according to Table no. 4 - Ranking of world states according to their Control of Corruption indicator is reflected in the Picture no. 1, below. This representation confirms that in 2016 the Scandinavian countries, known to have constructed distinct instruments of good governance, perform the best. Great Britain and Canada, which have good track records, as well as Benelux and the German states -Austria, Prussia and Bavaria. Similarly, in the second group we find the USA, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, fragments of the British Empire, which added to the British law customs their own experiences and democratic evolution. (Wallis et al., 2006).

Picture no. 1- Control of Corruption



Source: World Bank interactive data access tool, The Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at: [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org)

In countries like Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Syria, where political stability is precarious, almost inexistent and where no institutions to fight corruption exist or, if they exist, are themselves deeply corrupted, the level of corruption perception reaches maximal value, close to 0, these countries being labeled as extremely corrupt. Going on the regression line, countries where political stability is high and democracy really functions, corruption is low. For instance, in Denmark, Finland and Control of Corruption has values close to the maximum, corruption being at a minimal level, and in New Zealand the value of the indicator is maximal, of 100%, the Corruption Perception Index having the best score in the world.

Singapore is a success example, corruption here being reduced to levels which rival those in the Scandinavian countries, although this phenomenon has its roots in the countries' whole historical and colonial past. The scores of 2016, CPI 84, Quality of Regulations 100 and Control of Corruption 97.12, are the consequence of the reform started in the '70s, when Singapore reorganized The Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), conferring it considerable powers to reduce endemic corruption. CPIB based its work on corruption discouragement strategies, by giving considerable fines (100.000 dollars) and convictions of up to five years in prison. Singapore is a special case, because, although the country has a semi-authoritarian regime (also reflected in the score of only 36.95 of the indicator Voice and Accountability), through the fight against corruption a climate favorable to foreign investments has been created. In spite of centralization of power, CPIB proves that the government's engagement to fight corruption is essential to a significant reform.

Messages have been sent, primarily to the citizens, that corruption is not tolerated and then foreign investors have been ensured that their businesses are safe. Although the high level of foreign investments can't be attributed only to the CPIB, we must note that this has a very significant contribution and is part of the global image of this rapid economical growth, while warranting stability and a secure environment, good for developing investments/businesses. (Heilbrunn, 2004).

Another good example for the fight against corruption through state institutions is China, which, although registers modest scores for the global indicators of governance (6.90 for Voice and Accountability; 27.14 for Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; 67.79 for Government Effectiveness; 44.23 for Regulatory Quality; 46.15 for Rule of Law; 49.04 for Control of Corruption), has unprecedented economical results. To accomplish that, 10.000 public servants got harsh sanctions. Thus, China, produced in two years more concrete than USA did in the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century, the roads built sum up 4.000.000 de km, they built 300.000 bridges, some of them being longer than 1 km. Also, a 62 km long bridge is currently being built from Hong Kong to Macao, in order to create a connection between the two cities, across the ocean. Another significant project being financed with money that otherwise would have been lost to corruption is the construction of 100 airports, giant 150 km long viaducts and over 28 km long tunnels. Just to illustrate the matter, the trains connecting Huan-Chon-Ju to Hui-Ian go over 150 bridges and 236 tunnels, by going at a 250-km/hour speed. All this has been possible since 2000, the year when China started a fierce fight against corruption.

Romania can't boast with any such results, since the Romanian authorized institutions did not achieve, even by far, the results of their Chinese counterparts, only reaching, in ten years, an insignificant growth of 1.1 (from 3.7 to 4.8).

#### **IV. Conclusions**

As demonstrated in the present study (from Table no. 1), the most important factor that influences corruption perception is Regulatory Quality, and this confirms the theories which state that the control mechanisms, although important, both in prevention and in detection of corruption cases, are insufficient and can't be efficient in the absence of a strong regulatory framework. So, as it results also from the Report of The European Commission to the Council and Parliament, "in many EU Member States, domestic controls across the country (especially at the local level) are insufficient and uncoordinated. These controls need to be strengthened and correlated with robust prevention policies to achieve tangible and sustainable results against European corruption" (European Commission, Bruxelles, 2014).

Thus, as is mentioned in the Anticorruption report of the Commission, the procedural deficiencies can obstruct investigation of corruption cases, as well as excessive or unclear dispositions about the waiver of immunity, prescription periods, combined to long proceedings or rigid norms referring to the access of bank records terms – obstacles in the way of financial investigations and cross border cooperation – can hinder the closing of complex cases.

Studies and polls conducted in order to measure the corruption perception degree increase the corruption awareness level and the premises to fight against this scourge. Also, this way instruments, as well as methods are created to better valuate anti-corruption fight effectiveness.

The study conducted, in 2016, by TRACE International, Inc concluded that, although the legislative framework and the measures taken to fight corruption are on the rise in most countries, the global situation gets worse. Around 60% of the countries have an elevated bribery risk compared to the study of 2014, while only 32% have a low bribery risk.

Also, the research conducted revealed that the fight against corruption (Control of Corruption) accounts for only 46.81% of the Corruption Perception index, the inefficiency of this fight on a global level being demonstrated, since there are still countries which place a considerable pressure on the institutions responsible of ensuring the legislation is respected and on the prosecution or anti-corruption agencies, considered to be the only ones responsible for the fight against corruption. But although the activity of these institutions is important, the deeply rooted corruption can't be eradicated without having a global approach, which would aim the legal framework, in order to consolidate prevention measures, in correlation with control mechanisms.

Universal models and success recipes which to ensure the success of anti-corruptions efforts can't be established. A mechanism, which could work well in countries pertaining to the former British Empire, for instance, democratic Australia, a country with traditional independent justice system, could not bring the same results in countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as policies recommended for developing countries could not be right for post-conflict countries.

Under these conditions, although the global indicators of governance can't be used to evaluate success or failure of some policies, they managed to maintain a high interest for the governance topic and to constitute a stimulant for certain countries to implement reforms in order to improve governance quality.

Thus, internationally, organizations as United Nations (UN), European Council (E.C.), and the European Union, respectively, have adopted in the last three years important documents in the area of prevention and fight against corruption. United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) is ratified by over 170 countries, which engaged themselves to respect a series of good governance rules. Also, integrity, responsibility, good management of public affairs and of public goods are promoted, putting an end to moral relativism in governance. UNCAC and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and all related treaties and conventions show that the world now has universal good governance laws, that sovereign countries adopted of their own free will and which should be applied. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015).

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													Annex no. 1													
Nr. Cr.	Country	CPI2016	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	Nr. Cr.	Country	CPI2016	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	Nr. Cr.	Country	CPI2016	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption
1	New Zealand	90	97.04	99.05	97.12	99.04	98.08	100.00	60	Cuba	47	6.40	66.19	50.00	6.73	35.10	60.58	119	Togo	32	32.02	38.57	12.98	22.60	27.88	28.37
2	Denmark	90	98.03	74.76	99.04	92.31	97.60	99.04	61	Italy	47	79.31	58.10	71.63	75.00	61.06	59.62	120	Dominican Re	31	52.22	57.14	43.75	53.37	44.71	22.60
3	Finland	89	99.01	80.95	96.63	96.63	99.04	99.52	62	Saudi Arabia	46	3.94	28.57	63.46	55.77	67.79	62.98	121	Ecuador	31	37.93	42.86	38.46	12.98	26.92	29.33
4	Sweden	88	99.51	82.38	94.71	97.12	100.00	98.56	63	Sao Tome an	46	60.59	54.29	25.96	21.15	27.40	55.29	122	Malawi	31	48.28	45.24	22.60	19.71	38.46	24.04
5	Switzerland	86	97.54	95.71	99.52	98.08	98.56	96.15	64	Suriname	45	61.08	56.19	40.38	27.88	49.52	44.71	123	Honduras	30	33.50	33.81	23.08	30.77	12.02	27.88
6	Norway	85	100.00	91.43	98.56	92.79	99.52	98.08	65	Montenegro	45	49.26	50.95	57.69	62.50	53.37	54.33	124	Mexico	30	43.84	20.00	59.62	64.42	33.17	23.08
7	Singapore	84	36.95	99.52	100.00	100.00	96.15	97.12	66	Oman	45	20.20	71.90	61.54	72.80	65.38	66.35	125	Paraguay	30	45.32	53.33	21.63	42.31	28.85	25.00
8	Netherlands	83	98.52	77.62	96.15	98.56	97.12	94.71	67	Senegal	45	57.64	36.67	36.54	49.04	47.12	57.21	126	Laos	30	4.43	62.38	39.42	24.52	24.04	15.38
9	Canada	82	96.06	93.33	95.19	94.23	96.63	95.19	68	South Africa	45	67.98	42.38	64.90	62.02	58.17	60.10	127	Azerbaijan	30	7.39	17.62	49.04	43.75	31.73	17.79
10	Germany	81	94.58	70.95	94.23	96.15	91.35	93.75	69	Greece	44	68.97	41.90	62.50	59.13	59.13	56.73	128	Moldova	30	45.81	36.19	29.81	50.48	32.21	14.42
11	Luxembourg	81	98.55	97.62	93.27	93.75	93.75	97.60	70	Bahrain	43	8.374	18.10	65.87	72.12	66.35	56.25	129	Djibouti	30	12.81	23.81	16.83	25.48	17.31	30.29
12	United Kingdom	81	90.64	59.05	92.79	95.19	91.83	94.23	71	Ghana	43	67.49	40.00	46.15	45.67	54.81	50.96	130	Sierra Leone	30	42.36	40.48	10.10	16.83	21.63	20.19
13	Australia	79	94.09	81.90	92.31	97.60	95.19	93.27	72	Solomon Islal	42	62.56	62.86	15.38	15.38	40.38	43.75	131	Nepal	29	38.92	19.05	19.71	23.56	19.71	23.56
14	Iceland	78	95.07	96.19	90.38	86.54	89.90	95.67	73	Serbia	42	53.20	48.10	55.77	54.81	50.00	45.67	132	Kazakhstan	29	13.30	47.62	51.44	51.92	34.62	20.67
15	Hong Kong	77	54.68	74.29	98.08	99.52	93.27	91.83	74	Burkina Faso	42	48.77	15.24	34.62	37.98	34.13	53.37	133	Russia	29	15.27	16.67	44.23	37.02	21.15	18.75
16	Belgium	77	95.57	61.43	86.54	88.46	88.94	92.31	75	Turkey	41	29.56	5.71	54.81	61.06	48.56	50.48	134	Ukraine	29	47.29	6.19	31.73	36.06	23.56	19.71
17	Austria	75	93.10	72.86	91.83	91.35	95.67	91.35	76	Kuwait	41	28.08	41.429	46.63	52.88	56.73	50.00	135	Iran	29	11.33	20.48	45.67	9.13	25.96	25.96
18	The United States	74	84.24	58.57	91.35	91.83	92.31	89.90	77	Tunisia	41	56.65	13.333	45.19	33.17	55.77	53.85	136	Guatemala	28	34.98	26.19	30.29	47.12	14.90	25.48
19	Ireland	73	93.60	76.67	88.46	94.71	90.38	92.79	78	Bulgaria	41	59.61	47.143	65.38	73.56	53.85	51.44	137	Myanmar	28	24.14	23.33	16.35	18.75	16.83	30.77
20	Japan	72	77.83	86.19	95.67	90.38	88.46	90.87	79	Brazil	40	61.58	30.00	47.60	46.63	51.92	38.46	138	Papua New G	28	52.71	29.05	23.08	29.81	24.52	15.87
21	Uruguay	71	86.70	90.48	73.08	69.23	73.56	89.42	80	China	40	6.90	27.14	67.79	44.23	46.15	49.04	139	Kyrgyzstan	28	32.51	22.86	17.79	40.38	12.98	12.02
22	Estonia	70	88.67	68.57	82.69	93.27	86.54	84.62	81	India	40	58.62	14.29	57.21	41.35	52.40	47.12	140	Lebanon	28	31.53	8.10	35.58	40.87	18.75	13.94
23	France	69	82.27	44.29	89.90	83.17	89.42	90.38	82	Belarus	40	10.34	50.48	36.06	16.35	22.12	47.60	141	Nigeria	28	35.96	6.67	12.50	18.27	13.94	13.46
24	Bahamas	66	74.88	78.10	74.04	63.46	60.10	82.69	83	Jamaica	39	70.44	54.76	68.75	59.62	45.19	51.92	142	Guinea	27	26.11	30.95	14.90	19.23	8.65	14.90
25	Chile	66	76.85	63.81	79.33	89.90	84.62	82.21	84	Albania	39	51.72	55.238	52.4	60.58	39.42	41.35	143	Mauritania	27	24.63	20.95	21.15	24.04	23.08	21.63
26	United Arab Emirates	66	19.21	60.95	90.87	80.29	79.81	88.46	85	Bosnia and Herzegovina	39	40.89	32.857	37.98	48.56	43.75	37.02	144	Mozambique	27	33.99	12.38	18.75	25.00	15.87	18.27
27	Bhutan	65	44.83	82.86	70.19	26.92	68.27	83.17	86	Lesotho	39	47.78	37.143	20.19	38.46	47.60	57.69	145	Nicaragua	26	30.05	39.52	24.04	32.21	30.29	17.31
28	Israel	64	71.92	18.57	88.94	87.50	81.25	81.73	87	Panama	38	65.02	60.48	61.06	66.35	56.25	36.06	146	Bangladesh	26	31.03	10.48	25.48	22.12	30.77	21.15
29	Poland	62	72.41	63.33	73.56	79.81	74.52	76.44	88	Mongolia	38	60.10	73.33	50.48	52.40	46.63	35.58	147	Cameroon	26	21.67	14.76	22.12	23.08	15.38	11.06
30	Portugal	62	86.21	88.10	85.58	76.44	85.10	80.77	89	Zambia	38	35.47	52.86	27.40	32.69	43.27	42.31	148	Gambia	26	13.79	27.62	19.23	31.73	25.00	22.12
31	Barbados	61	84.73	81.43	81.73	68.75	76.92	87.98	90	Colombia	37	49.75	13.81	54.33	67.31	41.35	44.23	149	Kenya	26	41.87	9.52	41.35	41.83	32.69	16.83
32	Taiwan	61	79.80	79.05	89.42	87.02	85.58	78.85	91	Indonesia	37	50.25	33.33	53.37	50.00	38.94	42.79	150	Madagascar	26	37.44	31.43	10.58	25.96	25.48	16.35
33	Qatar	61	15.76	76.19	74.52	74.04	79.33	79.81	92	The FYR of M	37	38.42	32.381	56.25	68.27	41.83	46.63	151	Tajikistan	25	4.93	19.52	14.42	12.02	10.58	12.50
34	Slovenia	61	77.34	83.81	83.65	73.08	82.69	77.40	93	Morocco	37	29.06	35.714	50.96	45.19	49.04	52.88	152	Uganda	25	27.09	21.43	32.21	46.15	45.67	12.98
35	Saint Lucia	60	83.25	75.24	53.85	64.90	69.23	70.67	94	Liberia	37	43.35	25.714	8.173	15.87	17.79	26.44	153	Comoros	24	39.41	46.67	5.29	12.50	11.54	31.73
36	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	60	80.30	87.62	62.02	63.94	64.90	74.04	95	Argentina	36	65.52	53.81	60.58	33.65	39.90	46.15	154	Turkmenistan	22	0.49	34.76	11.54	1.92	5.29	4.33
37	Botswana	60	59.11	90.00	70.67	70.19	70.67	80.29	96	El Salvador	36	55.17	44.76	42.79	57.21	26.44	33.17	155	Zimbabwe	22	19.70	24.29	11.06	3.37	8.17	8.65
38	Dominica	59	75.86	90.95	55.29	61.54	72.12	70.19	97	Maldives	36	25.62	60.00	40.87	34.62	36.06	28.85	156	Cambodia	21	17.73	52.38	24.52	34.13	12.50	8.17
39	Cape Verde	59	78.33	77.14	56.73	42.79	63.46	79.33	98	Sri Lanka	36	42.86	49.52	44.71	51.44	54.33	48.08	157	Uzbekistan	21	2.46	34.29	30.77	4.33	11.06	10.10
40	Lithuania	59	76.35	71.43	82.21	84.62	81.73	73.08	99	Kosovo	36	41.38	38.10	37.50	47.60	37.98	40.38	158	The Democrat	21	10.84	4.29	5.77	7.69	4.33	7.69
41	Costa Rica	58	85.22	70.48	66.83	67.79	67.31	75.48	100	Benin	36	63.05	48.571	33.17	30.29	29.33	36.54	159	Haiti	20	26.60	22.38	0.96	8.17	16.35	7.21
42	Brunei	58	23.15	93.81	81.25	71.15	73.08	72.60	101	Peru	35	55.67	40.952	48.56	69.71	33.65	43.27	160	Burundi	20	7.88	5.24	7.69	20.67	7.69	10.58
43	Spain	58	81.28	61.90	83.17	81.73	80.77	68.75	102	Trinidad and Tobago	35	66.01	56.667	62.98	56.73	48.08	48.56	161	Central African	20	18.72	7.14	2.88	5.77	1.92	9.13
44	Georgia	57	53.69	35.24	71.15	81.25	63.94	73.56	103	Philippines	35	50.74	10.00	51.92	53.85	36.54	34.13	162	Chad	20	12.32	10.95	6.25	9.62	7.21	4.81
45	Latvia	57	74.38	59.52	78.85	83.65	80.29	67.31	104	Thailand	35	20.69	15.71	66.35	60.10	55.29	40.87	163	Republic of Congo	20	17.24	25.24	12.02	10.58	14.42	9.62
46	Grenada	56	73.40	87.62	47.12	56.25	71.63	69.71	105	Timor-Leste	35	54.19	43.33	13.94	13.94	10.10	34.62	164	Angola	18	16.75	31.90	13.46	13.46	13.46	5.77
47	Cyprus	55	82.76	65.71	78.37	82.69	75.48	77.88	106	Gabon	35	22.66	43.81	20.67	21.63	31.25	24.52	165	Equatorial Guinea	18	0.99	17.14	3.37	1.44	5.77	11.54
48	Czech Republic	55	80.79	83.33	79.81	80.77	84.13	67.79	107	Niger	35	34.48	11.90	31.25	26.44	29.81	31.25	166	Venezuela	17	18.23	12.86	8.65	2.40	4.48	6.73
49	Malta	55	88.18	89.52	77.40	85.10																				